Chenqiao Mutiny

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Chenqiao Mutiny

A 20th century interpretation of the Chenqiao Mutiny. Zhao Kuangyin is visible in yellow robes.
Date2 February 960
Location
Chen Bridge, Fengqiu County, Xinxiang, Henan, China
Result

Successful coup d'état by Zhao Kuangyin

Chinese name
Traditional Chinese陳橋兵變
Simplified Chinese陈桥兵变

The Chenqiao Mutiny was a mutiny and coup d'état during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period that resulted in the overthrow of the Later Zhou dynasty and the foundation of the Song dynasty. In response to an invasion by the Northern Han and Liao dynasty, general Zhao Kuangyin led his troops to Chenqiao. His troops soon mutinied and installed him as emperor. Although the official narrative recounts that a yellow imperial robe was forced upon Zhao and that he only accepted the emperorship reluctantly, most modern historians now agree that he helped orchestrate the mutiny. The newly founded Song dynasty would go on to reunify China and foster a golden age of economics, philosophy, and culture.

Background[edit]

Following the end of the An Lushan rebellion in the mid-700s, the Tang dynasty largely delegated its regional authority to the Jiedushi, or military governors.[1] The government was further weakened by Huang Chao's rebellion, which destroyed the Tang court's ability to appoint regional governors; the warlords that filled the power vacuum in the south would go on to found the Five Dynasties and Ten kingdoms.[2] The Five dynasties, the first of which was founded following Zhu Wen's usurpation of the throne from Emperor Ai of Tang,[3] ruled over northern China in quick succession, each supplanting the other via usurpation, war, and other violent means.[4]

Although the southern Ten Kingdoms were generally wealthier than the northern Five Dynasties, the last of the Five Dynasties, the Later Zhou, did lay a "limited foundation of wealth"[4] under the emperors Guo Wei and Chai Rong. Guo and Chai wore down the power of the regional military governors[5] strengthened the bureaucracy, centralized the military, and initiated serious plans to reunify China.[6] Chai in particular oversaw the conquest of significant territories from the Later Shu, Southern Tang (during the Later Zhou conquest of Huainan), and Liao dynasty respectively.[7] These administrative and military successes made Chai more legitimate than any emperor of the previous dynasties and enabled northern China to recover economically. Nonetheless, the Later Zhou's authority was not strong enough to sustain a child as emperor.[8]

Facilitating the military success of the Later Zhou was Zhao Kuangyin (Emperor Taizu of Song), a talented general who would later become the leader of the Chenqiao Mutiny. He joined the regional army of Guo Wei when he was 21 and helped the latter stage a successful coup against the Later Han. Zhao quickly rose through the ranks and endeared himself to Chai Rong by distinguishing himself in campaigns against the Later Shu and Southern Tang. His promotion to inspector-general of the Palace Command (one of the Later Zhou's armies, the other being the Metropolitan Command) allowed him to cultivate the personal loyalty of his troops.[9]

Events leading to the mutiny[edit]

Chai Rong died of illness in 959 and was succeeded by his five-year-old son, Guo Zongxun. Possibly capitalizing on their rival's preoccupation with succession, a joint Liao-Northern Han invasion was launched against the Later Zhou in early 960. Despite warnings from Han Tong, the inspector-general of the Metropolitan Command, that Zhao Kuangyin was too powerful to be trusted with overall command of the army,[10] Zhao was still dispatched to face the northern invasion after the emperor consulted Chancellors Fan Zhi and Wang Pu.[11] This circulated a rumor that Zhao's troops would mutiny because a child emperor under the regency of Empress Dowager Fu would not recognize the troops' services. In anticipation of this rumor's fruition, citizens fled the capital, Kaifeng, en masse.[10]

After marching his troops out of Kaifeng and crossing the Yellow River on 1 February, Zhao Kuangyin allowed his troops to rest at Chenqiao, a village 20 miles northeast of Kaifeng. He ordered his troops to camp on a piece of flatland near in front of the village's courier station, tied his horse to a pagoda tree, and entered a nearby house to drink some wine before falling asleep. That night, Zhao's officers agreed that he would properly reward them for service if he were emperor. The officers then consulted Zhao Kuangyi, Zhao Kuangyin's younger brother, about the plan. Kuangyi supported the plan for his brother to usurp the throne and added that, to remain popular, the generals should "discipline the officers and men under [themselves] and strictly prohibit them from looting".[12] Kuangyi then informed two of Kuangyin's loyal generals in Kaifeng about the imminent coup.[13][12]

Mutiny[edit]

Zhao Kuangyin was declared emperor by his troops the next dawn. According to the official history of the Song dynasty, Zhao's armor-clad officers stormed his bedroom and said: "Now we do not have a master. We will make you Emperor!" Surprised, Zhao jumped out of his bed only to be forcibly draped in an imperial yellow gown. The officers helped the reluctant Zhao onto his horse and the army marched south to Kaifeng.[14] On the way, Zhao threatened to refuse the throne if the mutineers did not pledge absolute loyalty to him and vowed to execute those who "dared to loot the capital or to molest its inhabitants".[13] Those who obeyed would be awarded handsomely.[13]

Aftermath[edit]

Zhao Kuangyin, posthumously honored Emperor Taizu of Song, marched his troops into Kaifeng the following day. Fan Zhi was so distressed that, upon receiving the news after finishing morning court, he squeezed Wang Pu's hand until it bled. Han Tong, the only serious opposition to Taizu's usurpation, was killed by a Song loyalist, and Guo Zongxun was exiled after an organized abdication.[15][13] While sitting in his office, Taizu cried to Fan Zhi and Wang Pu that he had been forced to take the throne. After a commander threatened them with a sword, Fan and Wang realized the theatre of the situation and kowtowed. Taizu then received the congratulations of the other officials, proclaimed the Song dynasty, and rewarded his supporters.[16] However, Taizu's mother, Empress Dowager Du, was unhappy. When questioned about this by her son, she said that it was impossible to become an ordinary man again if the emperorship was lost. Taizu bowed and vowed to always remember her teachings.[17]

The succession, which was so peaceful that street markets continued to trade, represented a significant break from the violent transitions of the previous Five Dynasties. Taizu's popularity was preserved and the Song dynasty was strong enough to resume the unification of China.[13] Taizu nonetheless compensated for the inherent illegitimacy of usurpation[18] by claiming the Mandate of Heaven; this was established via auspicious signs of Heaven's approval. Retrospective propaganda detailed many legitimizing portents that supposedly precipitated the Chenqiao Mutiny. One legend claims that an astrologer saw the sun being eclipsed by another sun.[19] Another claims that Chai Rong found a wooden plaque that said "The inspector-general is to be emperor" and summarily replaced the previous inspector-general of the Palace Command with Taizu.[9] To appear confident in his legitimacy, Taizu laughed off warnings that a newly enthroned emperor should not personally inspect society because Heaven would protect him.[19]

Several powerful individuals opposed Taizu's mutiny, namely Guo Chong, Yuan Yan, Li Yun, and Li Chongjin. Li Yun, the military governor of Luzhou (in modern-day Shanxi), sought an alliance with the Northern Han, but his rebellion was defeated by Song forces in under two months. Li Chongjin, the former chief of the Metropolitan Command and the governor of Yangzhou (in modern-day Jiangsu), tried to rebel alongside Li Yun; however, his envoy defected to the Song and he too was defeated in under two months. These military successes,[20] along with further structural reforms to the military,[21] dampened any remaining dissent amongst Taizu's generals.[20]

In mid-791, Taizu complained to his top generals at a drinking party that an incident similar to the Chenqiao Mutiny could be committed against him. He pointed out that wealth, prestige, and prosperous descendants were the essence of happiness and persuaded his generals (some of whom had assisted in the Mutiny) to give up their posts in exchange for appointment as regional military governors. Each general who resigned had his clan married into the royal family and lived the rest of their lives in comfortable retirement. This incident further increased Taizu's control over the military.[21] The powerful clans that resulted from these royal marriages would continue to supply empresses for Song emperors and would act as aristocratic counterparts to the meritocratically selected literati.[22]

Assessment[edit]

Most modern historians (such as Deng Guangming, Chen Dengyuan, and Wang Boqin) agree that Zhao Kuangyin, Zhao Kuangyi, and some key advisors engineered the Chenqiao Mutiny. Regardless of his actual willingness to take the throne, Zhao quickly took control of the situation after being declared emperor.[23]

Ouyang Xiu, author of the Historical Records of the Five Dynasties, stressed that the last emperor of the Later Zhou "relinquished" the throne to Zhao Kuangyin; translator Richard L. Davis notes that this implies "obedience" to the Mandate of Heaven, likely to legitimize Zhao's usurpation of the throne.[24]

Besides the relative lack of bloodshed, the Chenqiao Mutiny was initially considered a relatively unremarkable coup. Little indicated that the Song dynasty's lifespan would exceed that of the previous Five Dynasties. Yet, the political and military structures that Taizu and his successor created successfully ensured the longevity and internal peace of their dynasty.[25] For example, future Song emperors would personally control major aspects of military and fiscal policy;[26] the subjugation of most neighboring states and relative lack of child emperors meanwhile provided legitimacy for the new dynasty.[27]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 38.
  2. ^ Twitchett & Smith 2009, pp. 40–41.
  3. ^ Paludan 1998, p. 117.
  4. ^ a b Twitchett & Smith 2009, pp. 206–207.
  5. ^ Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 5.
  6. ^ Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 11.
  7. ^ Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 209.
  8. ^ Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 130.
  9. ^ a b Twitchett & Smith 2009, pp. 210–211.
  10. ^ a b Twitchett & Smith 2009, pp. 211–212.
  11. ^ Hung 2014, p. 61.
  12. ^ a b Hung 2014, pp. 62–63.
  13. ^ a b c d e Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 212.
  14. ^ Hung 2014, p. 64.
  15. ^ Hung 2014, p. 65.
  16. ^ Hung 2014, pp. 66–68.
  17. ^ Hung 2014, p. 69.
  18. ^ Chaffee & Twitchett 2015, p. 28.
  19. ^ a b Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 214.
  20. ^ a b Twitchett & Smith 2009, p. 215.
  21. ^ a b Twitchett & Smith 2009, pp. 216–217.
  22. ^ Chaffee & Twitchett 2015, p. 653.
  23. ^ Twitchett & Smith 2009, pp. 212–213.
  24. ^ Ouyang 2004.
  25. ^ Chaffee & Twitchett 2015, p. 7.
  26. ^ Chaffee & Twitchett 2015, p. 85-86.
  27. ^ Chaffee 1999, pp. 22–23.

Books[edit]

  • Twitchett, Denis; Smith, Paul Jakov (2009). The Cambridge History of China Volume 5 Part One: The Sung Dynasty and its Precursors, 907-1279. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-24330-8.
  • Chaffee, John; Twitchett, Denis (2015). The Cambridge History of China Volume 5 Part Two: Sung China, 960–1279. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-81248-1.
  • Paludan, Ann (1998). Chronicle of the Chinese Emperors. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd. ISBN 0-500-05090-2.
  • Chaffee, John (1999). Branches of Heaven A History of the Imperial Clan of Sung China. President and Fellows of Harvard College. ISBN 0-674-08049-1.
  • Ouyang, Xiu (2004). Historical Records of the Five Dynasties. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-12826-6.
  • Hung, Hing Ming (2014). Ten States, Five Dynasties, One Great Emperor. Algora Publishing. ISBN 978-1-62894-072-5.
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